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Abstract
In this study, considering the importance of how to exploit renewable
natural resources, we analyze a fishing model with nonlinear harvest-
ing function in which the players at the equilibrium point do a static
game with complete information that, according to the calculations,
will cause a waste of energy for both players and so the selection of
cooperative strategies along with the agreement between the players
is the result of this research.
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1 Introduction
Since game theory examines situations in which decision-makers interact,
this theory has many applications in the commercial competition between
individuals, companies, and countries (see [2],[8],[9],[14] and [15]).
For example, using this theory, we can examine how to use renewable natural
resources and different strategies. Consider a river, lake or sea exploited by
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fishermen or companies. If the number of fishermen is increased or more fish
are harvested, it will lead to the extinction of the generation of fishes in that
source.
If fishering from the source is done only by a fisherman, he(or she) will
consider the amount of current harvest because he(or she) knows that the
amount of fish may be reduced and harvesting in the future will require more
effort and cost, so he(or she) considers the effects of fishing today in the effort
and cost of future fishing. Now if two individuals or companies fish from a
natural resource, then fishing more today that leads to more cost and effort
in the future and it will be shared between them. Therefore, there is a mo-
tivation for more harvesting in the present by either fisherman.
The importance of exploiting renewable natural resources and paying atten-
tion to the above points have led to a widespread examination of the issue
of fishing and harvest management strategies that prevent the extinction of
species (see [1],[3],[4],[11],[12],[13] and [18]).
Of course, a large number of these studies have been investigated in Dynamic
Systems (see [5], [6], [10], [16], [17] and [19]).
The logistic equation with density-dependent harvesting (see [7]) is
dN
dt
= rN(1− N
K
)−H(t).
where N is the population biomass of fish at time t, r is the intrinsic rate of
growth of the population, K is the carrying capacity, and H(t) as the harvest
function is
H(t) = qEN(t)
where E is the fishing effort, the intensity of the human activities to extract
the fish and q ≥ 0 is the catchability coefficient which is defined as the frac-
tion of the population fished by a unit of effort.
In the above fishing mdel and many other models, the harvest function is
linear in terms of N(t) but we want to examine the effect of the nonlinear
harvest function of H(t) = qE(N(t))2 and since that fishermen or companies
usually harvest individually and based on their own profits, at the point of
equilibrium of the system we consider a static game with complete infor-
mation and as a result we calculate the amount of the waste of effort and
energy.
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2 Model formulation and basic properties
In this model, we consider the relation between net growth, W , and the
carrying capacity, K, a logistic growth function. So, we have
W = rN(1− N
K
). (2.1)
Assuming a nonlinear harvest function, H = qEN2, the dynamics of this
model is
dN
dt
= rN(1− N
K
)− qEN2.
It can be written as follows
dN
dt
= rN(1− N
K0
)
where K0 =
rK
r+qEK
. This system has a trivial equilibrium, N = 0, and an
non-trivial equilibrium, N = K0 =
rK
r+qEK
.
Considering f(N) = rN(1 − N
K
) − qEN2, we have dN
dt
= f(N). Since
df(N)
dN
= r − 2 rN
K
− 2qEN , then df(0)
dN
= r > 0 so the trivial equilibrium
point is unstable, and at the non-trivial equilibrium
df(K0)
dN
= −r
2−qEK
r+qEK
< 0
which shows the stability of this point.
On the other hand the differential equation of this system is a separable
type and it is solved by a method called separation of variables.
By solving this equation and taking B = N(0)
|K0−N(0)|
, it follows that if K0−N >
0 then N(t) = BK0e
rt
1+Bert
is the solution of this differential equation and since
limt→+∞N(t) = K0, it implies that the non-trivial equilibrium is asymp-
totically stable and if K0 − N < 0 then N(t) = −BK0ert1−Bert is the solution of
the differential equation and limt→+∞N(t) = K0 implies that the non-trivial
equilibrium is asymptotically stable.
According to the above, when the system reaches the equilibrium point,
where H =W (see Figure 1), we have
N =
rK
r + qEK
. (2.2)
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Which shows the relation between the equilibrium mass and the effort.
By substituting (2.2) in H(t), the relation between the level of effort and the
harvest is
H = qE(
rK
(r + qEK)
)2. (2.3)
We assume that there are two fishing companies, A1 and A2, which use this
source separately. They as players do a static game with complete informa-
tion in devoting the amount of effort to harvest. If E1 and E2 respectively
represent the level of effort of players A1 and A2 then the total effort to har-
vest from this source is ET = E1 + E2 and the total harvest of this effort is
HT = qET (
rK
(r+qETK)
)2.
In this model, we assume that the share of each company (player) is equal
to its share of total effort in other words
H1 =
E1
ET
HT =
E1
ET
qET (
rK
(r + qETK)
)2 = qE1(
rK
(r + q(E1 + E2)K)
)2,
H2 =
E2
ET
HT =
E2
ET
qET (
rK
(r + qETK)
)2 = qE2(
rK
(r + q(E1 + E2)K)
)2
where HT = H1 +H2.
If each unit of the harvest in the market has a value of P and one unit of
effort has a cost C, then the outcome of the players is
UA1(E1, E2) = PH1 − CE1 =
qPE1r
2K2
(r + q(E1 + E2)K)2
− CE1,
UA2(E1, E2) = PH2 − CE2 =
qPE2r
2K2
(r + q(E1 + E2)K)2
− CE2.
To find the Nash equilibrium we use the best response method. In this way,
we first do the calculations for player 1. So, assuming that E2 = E2 is positive
and constant, we have
UA1(E1, E2) = 0 =⇒ E1 = 0 ∨ E1 =
√
Pr2
qC
− β.
where β = ( r
qK
+ E2). But
E1 =
√
Pr2
qC
− β > 0⇐⇒ E2 < r(
√
P
qC
− 1
qK
). (2.4)
4
On the other hand, if
∂UA1(E1, E2)
∂E1
= qr
2PK2(r+q(E1+E2)K)−2r2q2PK3E1
(r+q(E1+E2)K)3
− c = 0
then by a simple calculations we have
E31 + 3E
2
1β + (3β
2 +
r2P
qC
)E1 =
r2P
qC
β − β3 (2.5)
where β = ( r
qK
+ E2).
We consider f1(E1) = E
3
1 +3E
2
1β+(3β
2+ r
2P
qC
)E1 and f2(E1) =
r2P
qC
β−β3
that according to (2.4) and β = r
qK
+E2 > 0 always f2(E1) =
r2P
qC
β−β3 > 0.
On the other hand, limE1→+∞ f1(E1) = +∞ and limE1→−∞ f1(E1) = −∞
and also f1(E1) = E1(E
2
1 +3βE1+(3β
2+ r
2P
qC
)) that E21 +3βE1+(3β
2+ r
2P
qC
)
has ∆ = −3β2 − 4 r2P
qC
< 0 then f1(E1) only has a real root E1 = 0.
Since
df1(E1)
dE1
= 3E21 + 6βE1 + (3β
2 + r
2P
qC
) then f1(E1) for E1 > 0 is always
an increasing function.
According to the above, functions f1 and f2 for E1 > 0 intersect each other
exactly at one point then UA1(E1, E2) for 0 < E2 < r(
√
P
qC
− 1
qK
) has exactly
a local extremum that we show it with E◦1 .
In order to determine the type of this extremum, we use the first derivative
test for UA1(E1, E2) in the neighborhood of this point, E
◦
1 . Since E
◦
1 > 0 ,
we consider ǫ > 0 such that E◦1 − ǫ > 0 in this case
dUA1 (E
◦
1
,E2)
dE1
=
−C(qKE◦
1
+(r+qKE2))3−q2r2PK3E◦1+qr
2PK2(r+qKE2)
(qKE◦
1
+(r+qKE2))3
= 0,
dUA1 (E
◦
1
+ǫ,E2)
dE1
=
−C(qK(E◦
1
+ǫ)+(r+qKE2))3−q2r2PK3(E◦1+ǫ)+qr
2PK2(r+qKE2)
(qK(E◦
1
+ǫ)+(r+qKE2))3
= −Cq
3K3ǫ3−3qKCθ1ǫ−3q2K2Cθ1ǫ2−q2r2K3Pǫ
(qK(E◦
1
+ǫ)+(r+qKE2))3
< 0
where θ1 = qKE
◦
1 + (r + qKE2) > 0,
dUA1 (E
◦
1
−ǫ,E2)
dE1
=
Cq3K3ǫ3+3qKCθ1ǫ(qK(E◦1−ǫ)+(r+qKE2))+q
2r2K3Pǫ
(qK(E◦
1
−ǫ)+(r+qKE2))3
> 0.
Therefore, according to the first derivative test, E◦1 is a relative maximal
point for UA1(E1, E2). According to the above, the best response function of
player 1 is
E1 = B1(E2) =


E◦1 for E2 < r(
√
P
qC
− 1
qK
)
0 for E2 ≥ r(
√
P
qC
− 1
qK
).
(2.6)
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Now we would like to calculate E◦1 as the root of Equation (2.5). For
E31 + 3E
2
1β + (3β
2 +
r2P
qC
)E1 + (β
3 − r
2P
qC
β) = 0
we consider
a = 3β, b = 3β2 + r
2P
qC
, and c = β3 − r2P
qC
β
then according to the calculation method of the roots of a third-order poly-
nomial, we have
p = b− a2
3
= r
2P
qC
, q = 2a
3
27
− ab
3
+ c = −2( r2Pβ
qC
) and
∆ = q
2
4
+ p
3
27
= r
4P 2
q2C2
(β2 + 1
27
r2P
qC
) > 0.
Since ∆ > 0, then (2.5) has only one real root that we already showed it
with E◦1 and this root is
E◦1 = (− q2 +
√
∆)
1
3 + (− q
2
−
√
∆)
1
3 − a
3
= (( r
2P
qC
)(β +
√
β2 + 1
27
r2P
qC
))
1
3 + (( r
2P
qC
)(β −
√
β2 + 1
27
r2P
qC
))
1
3 − β.
Therefore
E1 = B1(E2) =

(( r
2P
qC
)(β +
√
β2 + 1
27
r2P
qC
))
1
3 + (( r
2P
qC
)(β −
√
β2 + 1
27
r2P
qC
))
1
3 − β for E2 < r(
√
P
qC
− 1
qK
)
0 for E2 ≥ r(
√
P
qC
− 1
qK
)
where β = r
qK
+ E2.
According to the symmetry of the game and with a completely similar dis-
cussion for the second player, we conclude that
E2 = B2(E1) =

(( r
2P
qC
)(β∗ +
√
β2∗ +
1
27
r2P
qC
))
1
3 + (( r
2P
qC
)(β∗ −
√
β2∗ +
1
27
r2P
qC
))
1
3 − β∗ for E1 < r(
√
P
qC
− 1
qK
)
0 for E1 ≥ r(
√
P
qC
− 1
qK
).
where β∗ =
r
qK
+E1. According to the functions E1 and E2, we can obtain
Nash equilibrium for this model from solutions of the following system
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

E1 = ((
r2P
qC
)(β +
√
β2 + 1
27
r2P
qC
))
1
3 + (( r
2P
qC
)(β −
√
β2 + 1
27
r2P
qC
))
1
3 − β that β = r
qK
+ E2
E2 = ((
r2P
qC
)(β∗ +
√
β2∗ +
1
27
r2P
qC
))
1
3 + (( r
2P
qC
)(β∗ −
√
β2∗ +
1
27
r2P
qC
))
1
3 − β∗ that β∗ = rqK + E1.
(2.7)
Since the above system is complicated based on the parameters r, q, P , C
and K, to make a clearer analysis and easier understanding of the problem,
we consider the following values for the parameters
r = P = 1, q = C =
1√
27
and K =
√
27.
In this case, the system (2.7) is{
E1 = 3(((1 + E2) +
√
(1 + E2)2 + 1)
1
3 + ((1 + E2)−
√
(1 + E2)2 + 1)
1
3 )− 1− E2
E2 = 3(((1 + E1) +
√
(1 + E1)2 + 1)
1
3 + ((1 + E1)−
√
(1 + E1)2 + 1)
1
3 )− 1− E1
(2.8)
We have solved the above nonlinear system with the iterative method, it
has an approximate unique solution (E1, E2) = (1, 1), with very little error.
This unique solution is the Nash equilibrium of this model that we represent
with (E∗1 , E
∗
2) therefore (E
∗
1 , E
∗
2) = (1, 1).
The total effort and harvest in the Nash equilibrium, ET and HT , are
ET = E
∗
1 + E
∗
2
∼= 1 + 1 = 2
and
HT = H
∗
1 +H
∗
2
where
H∗1 = qE
∗
1(
rK
(r + q(E∗1 + E
∗
2)K)
)2 =
√
27
9
= 0.5773502691 ∼= 0.577
and similarly
H∗2
∼= 0.577
then HT ∼= 1.15.
On the other hand, by substituting in (2.3) we have
HT = qET (
rK
(r + qETK)
)2 =
√
27ET
(1 + ET )2
∼= 1.15.
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But the recent relation is almost equivalent to
1.15E2T − 2.9ET + 1.15 = 0.
For this equation ∆ = 3.12 ,
√
∆ = 1.7663521733 ∼= 1.77, and its roots are
ET1 = 0.4913043478
∼= 0.49 and ET2 = 2.0304347826 ∼= 2.03.
It should be noted that ET2 is approximately the sum of the levels of effort
of the players in Nash equilibrium and these two roots indicate that the
amount of harvest in the Nash equilibrium can be obtained with ET2 and
with less effort ET1 . Since ET2 − ET1 ∼= 1.54, then in ET2 that players are
doing a static game with complete information thay are wasting 1.54 units
of effort because the mass of fish is reduced and fishing is hardly done and
players should spend more effort to harvest more. Therefore, by considering
certain values as parameters, in order to make a clearer analysis, we conclude
when the harvest function is nonlinear, doing a static game causes a waste
of energy and money of both players. Therefore, doing a cooperative game
with the agreement of the parties will be for the benefit of each player.
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